KARIM ASHRAF SPACE.
  • Who Am I ?
  • WRITEUPS
    • What about Practice in Cyber Security?
    • Dark Side of VSCode
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    • Cyberdefenders Labs
      • Web Investigation Blue Team Lab
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      • BlueSky Ransomware Blue Team Lab
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    • Lets Defend
      • Incident Responder Path
        • Cybersecurity Incident Handling Guide
          • Introduction to Incident Handling
          • Incident Handling Steps
          • Preparation
          • Detection and Analysis
          • Containment, Eradication, and Recovery
          • Post-Incident Activity
        • Incident Response on Windows
          • How to Create Incident Response Plan?
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          • Free Tools That Can Be Used
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          • Users and Groups
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        • Hacked Web Server Analysis
          • Introduction to Hacked Web Server Analysis
          • Log Analysis on Web Servers
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        • Log Analysis with Sysmon
          • Introduction and Set Up of Sysmon
          • Detecting Mimikatz with Sysmon
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        • Forensic Acquisition and Triage
          • Introduction to Forensics Acquisition and Triage
          • Acquiring Memory Image From Windows and Linux
          • Custom Image Using FTK and Mounting Image for Analysis
          • KAPE Targets for Acquisition
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        • Memory Forensics
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          • Introduction to Windows Registry Forensics
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          • System, Users and Network Information
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          • Recent Files
          • Dialogue Boxes MRU
        • Event Log Analysis
          • Introduction to Event Logs
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        • Browser Forensics
          • Introduction to Browser Forensics
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          • Shell
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        • Hunting AD Attacks
          • Introduction to Active Directory
          • Hunting AS-REP Roasting Attack
          • Hunting for Kerberoasting Attacks
          • Hunting for LDAP Enumerations (Bloodhound_Sharphound)
          • Hunting for NTDS Database Dumping
          • Hunting for Golden Ticket Attacks
          • Hunting for NTLM Relay Attacks
        • Writing a Report on Security Incident
          • Introduction to Technical Writing
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        • How to Prepare a Cyber Crisis Management Pla
          • Introduction to Crisis Management
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    • The Complete Active Directory Security Handbook
      • Introduction
      • Active Directory
      • Attack Technique 1: Pass the Hash: Use of Alternate Authentication Material (T1550)
      • Attack Technique 2: Pass the Ticket: Use of Alternate Authentication Material (T1550)
      • Attack Technique 3: Kerberoasting
      • Attack Technique 4: Golden Ticket Attack
      • Attack Technique 5: DCShadow Attack
      • Attack Technique 6: AS-REP Roasting
      • Attack Technique 7: LDAP Injection Attack
      • Attack Technique 8: PetitPotam NTLM Relay Attack on a Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS)
      • Conclusion & References
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      • EoP - Impersonation Privileges
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      • References
      • Practical Labs
    • Advanced Log Analysis
      • Key Windows Event IDs for Cybersecurity Monitoring
      • Analyzing a Series of Failed Login Attempts from Multiple IP Addresses
      • Steps to Investigate Suspicious Outbound Network Traffic
      • Identifying and Responding to Lateral Movement within a Network
      • Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Malicious PowerShell Executions
      • Detecting and Analyzing a Potential Data Exfiltration Incident Using Log Data
      • Steps to Analyze PowerShell Logging (Event ID 4104) for Malicious Activity
      • How to Identify an Internal Pivot Attack Using Log Data
      • Indicators in Logs Suggesting a Privilege Escalation Attack
      • How to Detect Command and Control (C2) Communication Using Log Analysis
      • How to Analyze Logs to Detect a Brute-Force Attack on an RDP Service
      • How to Analyze Logs to Detect a Brute-Force Attack on an RDP Service
      • How to Detect the Use of Living-Off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) in Logs
      • How to Detect Malware Masquerading as a Legitimate Process Using Log Analysis
      • How to Detect and Analyze Lateral Movement Using Windows Event Logs
      • How to Detect Potential Ransomware Attacks in Their Early Stages Using Log Analysis
      • How to Detect and Analyze Privilege Escalation Using Windows Event Logs
      • How to Detect the Use of Mimikatz or Similar Tools in Log Data
      • How to Detect and Analyze DNS Tunneling Through Log Analysis
      • How to Detect a Pass-the-Hash (PtH) Attack Using Logs
      • How to Detect and Analyze an Attacker’s Use of a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) Using Log Data
      • How to Detect Lateral Movement Using Windows Event Logs
      • How to Detect and Investigate Data Exfiltration Using Logs
      • How to Identify and Analyze an Internal Phishing Campaign Using Email and System Logs
      • How to Detect and Analyze Ransomware Activity Using Logs
      • How to Detect Malicious PowerShell Activity Using Log Analysis
      • How to Detect and Respond to Brute-Force Attacks Using Log Data
      • How to Detect Privilege Escalation Attempts Using Windows Event Logs
      • How to Detect and Analyze Suspicious Domain Name Resolution Requests in DNS Logs
      • How to Detect and Respond to Unauthorized Access to Critical Files
      • How to Detect and Analyze Suspicious PowerShell Command Execution
      • How to Detect and Investigate Account Takeover (ATO) Attempts Using
      • How to Detect and Analyze the Use of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins)
      • How to Detect and Investigate Lateral Movement
      • How to Detect and Investigate Data Exfiltration
      • How to Detect and Analyze Suspicious Activity Involving Service Accounts
      • How to Detect and Investigate Anomalous PowerShell Activity Related to Credential Dumping
      • How to Detect and Analyze the Execution of Unsigned or Malicious Executables
      • How to Detect and Investigate Abnormal Spikes in Network Traffic
    • Methods for Stealing Password in Browser
      • Important Tables and Columns
      • Important Queries
      • Profiles
      • Tools
        • HackBrowserData
        • Browser-password-stealer
        • BrowserPass
        • WebBrowserPassView
        • Infornito
        • Hindsight
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    • Hack The Box Tracks
      • Soc Analyst Path 2024
        • 1. Incident Handling Process
          • Incident Handling Definition & Scope
          • Incident Handling's Value & Generic Notes
          • Cyber Kill Chain
          • Incident Handling Process Overview
          • Preparation Stage (Part 1)
          • Preparation Stage (Part 2)
          • DMARC
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          • Detection & Analysis Stage (Part 1)
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          • Detection & Analysis Stage (Part 2)
          • The Investigation
          • Initial Investigation Data
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          • Identification Of New Leads & Impacted Systems
          • Data Collection & Analysis From The New Leads & Impacted Systems
          • Containment
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          • Post-Incident Activity Stage
          • Reporting
        • 2. Security Monitoring & SIEM Fundamentals
          • What Is SIEM?
          • The Evolution Of SIEM And How It Works
          • SIEM Business Requirements & Use Cases Log Aggregation & Normalization
          • Data Flows Within A SIEM
          • What Are The Benefits Of Using A SIEM Solution
          • What Is the Elastic Stack?
          • The Elastic Stack As A SIEM Solution
          • How To Identify The Available Data
          • The Elastic Common Schema (ECS)
          • SOC Definition & Fundamentals
          • Evolution of Security Operations Centers (SOCs)
          • What Is MITRE ATT&CK?
          • What Is A SIEM Use Case?
          • How To Build SIEM Use Cases
          • SIEM Visualization Example 1: Failed Logon Attempts (All Users)
          • SIEM Visualization Example 2: Failed Logon Attempts (Disabled Users)
          • SIEM Visualization Example 3: Successful RDP Logon Related To Service Accounts
          • SIEM Visualization Example 4: Users Added or Removed from a Local Group
          • What Is Alert Triaging?
  • COURSES SUMMARY
    • TCM SEC
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    • The SecOps Group
      • Certified AppSec Practitioner exam
      • CNSP Review
    • Cybrary
      • Cybrary Offensive Pentesting
  • TIPS&TRICKS
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On this page
  • Windows Firewall Event Logs for Threat Detection
  • Key Event IDs for Monitoring Windows Firewall Activity
  • 1. Event ID 2004: Rule Added to Exception List
  • 2. Event ID 2005: Rule Modified
  • 3. Event ID 2003: Firewall Disabled
  • Attack Detection Scenarios
  • 1. Suspicious Application Rules
  • 2. Rule Modifications
  • 3. Firewall Disabling
  • Mitigation and Response Strategies
  • 1. Real-Time Monitoring
  • 2. Regular Firewall Rule Audits
  • 3. Limit Administrative Privileges
  • 4. Implement Group Policies
  • 5. Incident Response
  • Key Points
  1. WRITEUPS
  2. Lets Defend
  3. Incident Responder Path
  4. Event Log Analysis

Windows Firewall Event Logs

Windows Firewall Event Logs for Threat Detection

Windows Firewall logs are a crucial resource for monitoring network activity and detecting potential threats. By focusing on specific Event IDs, security analysts can identify unauthorized changes to firewall rules, attempts to disable the firewall, and other suspicious activities that may indicate malicious behavior such as Command and Control (C2) communication, lateral movement, or data exfiltration.


Key Event IDs for Monitoring Windows Firewall Activity

1. Event ID 2004: Rule Added to Exception List

  • Log Location: Application and Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows → Windows Firewall with Advanced Security → Firewall

  • Details:

    • Triggered when a new firewall rule is added.

    • Provides details about the rule’s name, path, and protocol.

  • Fields of Interest:

    • Rule Name: Indicates the rule’s intended purpose. Watch for generic or suspicious names.

    • Application Path: Verify whether the executable path points to trusted locations (e.g., C:\Windows\System32) or suspicious ones (e.g., user temp folders).

    • Modifying User: Identify if the rule was created by SYSTEM or a specific user account.

    • Protocol and Direction: Focus on outbound rules or protocols like UDP that might indicate C2 communication or data exfiltration.

  • Use Case: Detect unauthorized applications or scripts being allowed through the firewall.

2. Event ID 2005: Rule Modified

  • Log Location: Same as above.

  • Details:

    • Logs any modifications to existing firewall rules.

  • Fields of Interest:

    • Rule ID: Unique identifier to correlate changes with specific rules.

    • Modified Settings: Focus on changes to application paths, protocols, or direction (e.g., changing from inbound to outbound).

  • Use Case: Identify attempts to modify legitimate rules for malicious purposes, such as enabling unauthorized network traffic or maintaining persistence.

3. Event ID 2003: Firewall Disabled

  • Log Location: Same as above.

  • Details:

    • Indicates that the Windows Firewall has been disabled.

  • Key Fields:

    • New Setting Type: "Enable Windows Defender Firewall."

    • Value: A value of "No" indicates the firewall is disabled.

  • Use Case: Detect and investigate attempts to disable firewall protection, which is a significant indicator of an attacker trying to evade detection.


Attack Detection Scenarios

1. Suspicious Application Rules

  • Indicators:

    • Outbound rules allowing uncommon protocols (e.g., UDP).

    • Non-standard ports commonly used for C2 traffic or data exfiltration.

  • Example: A rule named "Windows Update Task" that allows outbound traffic for an executable located in C:\Users\Public\Scripts.

2. Rule Modifications

  • Indicators:

    • Existing rules modified to allow broader access or to point to malicious executables.

    • Legitimate service rules altered to permit backdoor communication.

  • Example: A rule for Remote Desktop modified to allow traffic on a non-standard port, potentially indicating lateral movement.

3. Firewall Disabling

  • Indicators:

    • An unexpected firewall disablement event.

    • Often occurs during or just before large-scale attacks, such as ransomware deployment.

  • Example: Event ID 2003 logs the disabling of the firewall shortly before an increase in suspicious outbound connections.


Mitigation and Response Strategies

1. Real-Time Monitoring

  • SIEM Integration:

    • Use a SIEM solution to monitor and alert on Event IDs 2004, 2005, and 2003.

    • Correlate with other security logs (e.g., login events, PowerShell activity) for a comprehensive view.

2. Regular Firewall Rule Audits

  • Periodically review firewall rules for anomalies or unauthorized modifications.

  • Validate the legitimacy of newly added or modified rules, especially those created by non-administrative users.

3. Limit Administrative Privileges

  • Restrict the ability to create or modify firewall rules to authorized personnel only.

  • Implement role-based access control (RBAC) to minimize the risk of unauthorized changes.

4. Implement Group Policies

  • Use Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to enforce firewall rules and ensure they cannot be disabled by non-privileged users.

  • Configure firewall logging to ensure comprehensive tracking of all rule changes.

5. Incident Response

  • Investigate Immediately: Treat firewall disablement (Event ID 2003) or suspicious rule changes as high-priority incidents.

  • Isolate Affected Systems: Prevent further lateral movement or data exfiltration by isolating compromised machines.

  • Preserve Logs: Ensure logs are forwarded to a secure, remote location to prevent tampering.


Key Points

Windows Firewall event logs are a powerful tool for detecting and responding to malicious activities. By focusing on Event IDs 2004, 2005, and 2003, security teams can identify unauthorized changes to firewall configurations, prevent network-based attacks, and maintain a robust defense posture. Integrating these logs with a SIEM solution and enforcing strict access controls further strengthens an organization’s ability to detect and mitigate threats effectively.

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Last updated 6 months ago